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Computer security has long been one of the most important research areas in computer 
science. In recent years, the rapid growth in Internet based industry has raised the importance of 
computer security to an unprecedented level. However, at the same time, profit driven commercial 
software development always leaves security concerns behind the quick incorporation of new 
functionalities. Therefore, the need to improve the security of these products is very urgent now. 
Microsoft Windows 2000, as one of the most popular operating systems, also needs to be improved. 
Especially, because of the unavailability of the necessary documentation and source code, few third 
party research and development have been done for Windows 2000 operating system kernel. In this 
paper, we introduce WinLomac, a prototype security enhancement software for Windows 2000 
operating system that enforces Low Water Mark integrity model based Mandatory Access Control 
in the kernel. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
1. 1 Motivation 
Computer security has always been an important topic in academia and industry, and the 
rapid growth in E-Commerce has raised its importance to an unprecedented level. Yet commercial 
organizations in the world are driven by profit. They are pushed by the demand from the market as 
well as the tough competition so that they have to integrate Internet related functionalities into their 
products and deliver them to the market as quickly as possible in order to lead the market. Thus, 
security concerns are always left behind, even though it is not unusual to hear stories about virus 
attacks or hacker break-ins from the news media. 
Researchers have been working on security issues for over 30 years. In the past, the 
advanced security features are used mainly in proprietary computer systems such as Multics 
operating system designed in late 60's [23], which was one of the earliest system that incorporated 
mandatory access control (MAC) as part of its security features [23]. Now, as the microcomputers 
become more and more powerful, and also because of the highly interconnected nature of 
computers, security becomes a major issue for general purpose computers and operating systems. 
Though, the goal of security for these systems is essentially the same as those proprietary systems, 
the general purpose nature of mainstream computer hardware and operating systems make a 
difference in implementing security protection in these environments. 
Due to the overwhelming importance of confidentiality, both academia and industry have 
put most of their efforts on the research to protect secrecy, which leads to all kinds of 
products/protocols that may enhance data confidentiality for both the storage and the 
communication. Such products/protocols include multi-level security (MLS) based MAC, Data 
Encryption Standard (DES) encryption software, Secure Shell (SSH), Secure Socket Layer (SSL), 
IP Security (IPSec ), etc. Although the mechanisms for data confidentiality protection have 
improved significantly, Internet based organizations are suffering from damages induced by 
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integrity harassment such as defacing of websites and unauthorized change to customer database, 
which cause direct or indirect loss of customers and business. Finally, such losses will lead to the 
loss of revenue. 
Recently, National Security Agency and NAILABS worked together and released Security 
Enhanced Linux (SELinux), which incorporates mandatory access control into Linux kernel [9] [ 1 O]. 
Although SELinux made a big noise among security professionals around the world and was proven 
to be a successful product, a worldwide recognition of its value has yet to be acknowledged by the 
end-user community. 
One possible reason for the security products not being used widely is the cost, especially 
for commercial organizations. The security features may bring in incompatibility between the kernel 
and application software in production systems [5][6]. The training of users of the systems, the 
administration, and the change in the way that the systems function are all part of the cost. Although 
the use of security products may reduce the cost incurred by attacks and accidents that may cause 
loss in profit and thereby saves money on the long run, currently, most companies still pay more 
attention to the fast response requirement and short term benefit than the attention to the long term 
savmg. 
In order to overcome such challenge and to promote the adoption of security products, 
consideration has to be made to reduce the cost overhead. Therefore, technologies based on 
modification and recompilation of kernel will not be a good candidate, due to the high cost of the 
service breakdown during the reinstallation. Some user space based technologies have been proven 
effective and cost efficient and accepted widely such as virus scanner, firewall, etc [6]. A common 
problem with these technologies is that the lack of kernel based protection makes themselves 
vulnerable to attacks. So it is necessary to establish kernel based protection and to maintain the user 
friendliness at the same time. NAILABS' LOMAC project is an attempt to achieve this objective, 
and its design goals are [6]: 
1. LOMAC should be compatible with the existing deployed Commercial Off-The-Shelf 
(COTS) operating system kernels and applications. This goal implies that LOMAC should 
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not require the replacement or source-code modification of any existing software in order 
to operate. 
2. LOMAC should not require any changes to pre-existing kernel or application 
configurations. 
3. LO MAC should not cause failures in previously working applications. 
4. LOMAC's existence should be largely invisible to the user except at the times when specific 
integrity threats occur. This goal implies that the user should not be required to learn any 
new behaviors in order to work in a LOMAC-enhanced environment. 
5. LOMAC should provide some useful protection in its default configuration. This goal 
implies that LOMAC must offer a useful default "one size fits all" integrity policy for those 
adopters who do not wish to expend the effort required to learn about and configure 
LOMAC. 
Total compatibility cost is defined as the cost incurred by failing to meet the above 
compatibility goals [6]. Because it may not be possible to achieve a zero total compatibility cost, 
especially for the difficulty in achieving the third goal, partial compatibility cost is defined as the 
same criteria as total compatibility cost excluding the third goal. The success of NAILABS' 
LOMAC project has shown that kernel based MAC can also be applied as a security enhancement 
with low partial compatibility cost [6]. 
Yet another problem is the paradox of Microsoft Windows. It has long been the focus of 
critics that both Microsoft Windows NT/2000 server and Internet Explorer have security problems. 
But Microsoft's market share of active servers has increased from 0% to 25% through the past eight 
years [17]. And the client side market is dominated by Microsoft Windows. According to Larry 
Seltzer, since Code Red virus came out, the Internet Information Services' (IIS) market share 
among all web servers has gone from 26 percent to 34 percent [ 18]. Though the percentage dropped 
recently according to NetCraft's statistics [17], it does not seem that this drop is caused by the effect 
of the security concerns raised by virus attacks in the second half of year 2001. It will not be an easy 
job to convince people to use more secure and cheaper Linux as their operating platform, due to the 
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relative shortage of applications on Linux platform. Therefore, it 1s important to improve the 
security of Windows operating systems. 
Research and development on kernel based security enhancement are mostly done on the 
open source code operating systems including Linux, FreeBSD, etc. Furthermore, most UNIX based 
operating systems may benefit from such research because of the similarity in operating system 
architecture. However, due to the substantial difference in kernel architecture and the unavailability 
of source code of Microsoft products, few research and development have been done on Windows 
operating system kernel outside Microsoft Corporation or its associates. Therefore, it is essential to 
improve the security of the Microsoft Windows operating system by taking advantage of the latest 
research results. 
1.2 Roadmap 
In this paper, we present WinLomac -- a prototype of Mandatory Access Control software 
for Microsoft Windows 2000 operating system, based on Low Water Mark integrity protection 
model. Section 2 describes related works in security enhancement on general purpose operating 
systems. Section 3 outlines the computer integrity problem and protection as well as corresponding 
policy and model. Section 4 presents the design and implementation of WinLomac. Section 5 
provides the testing result of WinLomac on Windows 2000. Section 6 concludes our paper with 
discussion on future works. 
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2 RELATED WORKS 
Mandatory Access Control (MAC) has been explored extensively in the past. One of the 
earliest computer systems that use MAC is Multics system (Multiplexed Information and 
Computing Service), which is a mainframe timesharing operating system developed around 1965 
and used till year 2000 [23]. 
In recent years, due to the rapid development of Internet based services, the research in 
operating system and network security is also being advanced very quickly. Many researchers are 
trying to incorporate technology used in mainframes and proprietary systems into personal 
computers and general purpose operating systems. Among these, SELinux [9][10], LOMAC [5][6] 
and TrustedBSD [11][12][13] are three very important ones that enhance the security within the 
kernel. 
Application level protection may also be useful to enhance the security of the whole system, 
such as firewalls, virus scanner, and file system scanner, etc. Tripwire is such a software product 
that has been proven to be very successful both technically and commercially [24]. In this section, 
we will describe SELinux, TrustedBSD, LOMAC as well as Tripwire. 
2.1 SELinux 
SELinux [9][10] is a Linux system with FLASK security architecture [7] built in by 
modifying the Linux source code. The design goal of this architecture is to provide strong MAC that 
could be used for traditional operating systems. One very important part is to support flexible 
security policies, since no single MAC policy model is likely to satisfy everyone's security 
requirements. This is achieved by cleanly separating the security policy logic from the enforcement 
mechanism [9] [ 1 O]. Finally, the FLASK architecture was also enhanced to provide better support 
for dynamic security policies, which means that the system can load security policies without being 
shut down. 
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The main idea of the FLASK architecture is to add a security server to the kernel and to use 
object managers to enforce the security policy. The security server is a kernel subsystem that is 
responsible for loading security policy and making access decisions in accordance with the policy. 
The object managers are other kernel subsystems like process management subsystem, file 
subsystem, etc. Each subject and each object has a security label assigned by the system. All 
accesses from a subject to an object or between two subjects must be authorized by the security 
server based on the security policy as well as the security labels. The security model chosen for the 
prototype SELinux security server is a combination of Identity-Based Access Control (IBAC), Role-
Based Access Control (RBAC), and Type Enforcement (TE). IBAC uses identity (e.g. root, guest, 
etc.) of the subject or the owner of the subject as the basis for access decisions. RBAC makes access 
decisions based on the role (e.g. web master, database administrator, etc.) the subject is playing. 
With TE, types and relationship between types can be defined, on which the access decisions are 
based. The combination model has been proven very effective and very flexible [9]. There is also an 
access vector cache (A VC) that stores access decisions in order to improve the performance. This 
cache also supports revocation of permissions, which may be caused by the re-labeling of an object. 
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The MAC enforcement is transparent to applications and users except the case that an 
access failure occurs. In this case, a normal Linux error code is returned. Only in few occasions, 
application may not be able to handle access failures that were not previously possible in normal 
Linux. Therefore, it is highly compatible with current applications [9]. In addition to previously 
existing Linux API, it also provides new API functions to allow modified and new applications to 
be developed to have some degree of awareness of the new security features. 
The performance overhead incurred by the security features added in SELinux is also 
insignificant in practice [9]. Although the overhead is measured to be large for every single system 
level operation, the overall performance degradation is very small under typical workloads. 
2.2 TrustedBSD 
TrustedBSD [11][12][13] is a project to add trusted operating system functionality to 
FreeBSD, including improvements to the kernel and user land security infrastructure, services to 
better support security features, and specific security features including Access Control Lists 
(ACLs), fine-grained privileges ("Capabilities"), and MAC. Currently, the MAC part in 
TrustedBSD are fixed or hard coded and not customizable. 
Some important components of TrustedBSD are Extended Attribute (EAs), Access Control 
Lists (ACLs), Capabilities, and Mandatory Access Control (MAC). Extended Attributes feature 
provides a clean abstraction for associating additional meta-data with files and directories, a 
requirement for the implementation of many new kernel security features (ACLs, Capabilities, 
MAC, etc.) as well as a feature that is also useful for other applications. Finer grained Discretionary 
Access Control (DAC) mechanism -ACLs (Extended POSIX. le) allows users to express precise 
policies for access files and directories that they own. Finer grained privilege model is implemented 
as support for capabilities based on POSIX. le. With this, the privilege set is decomposed into 
several logical components, decoupling privilege from the user ID (UID) of each process. Processes 
may manage the availability, inheritance, and effectiveness of capabilities, limiting the scope of 
damage due to compromise. Three fixed MAC policies: Multi-level security (MLS), a fixed-label 
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Biba policy, and a generalization of the native FreeBSD Jail compartmentalization policy are 
implemented by labeling subjects and objects [11][12]. 
Engineering method to provide better coding quality like regression tests is used to improve 
security. The cooperation between TrustedBSD team and FreeBSD team also provides great help in 
improving the correctness of the implementation and system security [12]. 
2.3 LOMAC 
LOMAC [5][6] is an open source project by NAILABS. It uses Linux loadable kernel 
module technology to enforce a form of MAC based on the Low Water Mark integrity model. It is 
not designed to provide flexible security policies for different application environments. On the 
contrary, it is designed in response to the needs to enhance the security of COTS environments. 
Therefore, it focuses on providing useful integrity protection without any site-specific configuration, 
regardless of the software and users present on a system. It should be possible to implement the 
Low Water Mark model in SELinux as a particular policy. 
LOMAC uses a simplified Low Water Mark integrity protection policy, which divides the 
subjects and objects into 2 categories: high integrity and low integrity. Low integrity subjects cannot 
modify high integrity objects. LOMAC can also revise the integrity category of any high integrity 
subject based on its behaviors according to the policy. For example, after a high integrity subject 
reads a low integrity object, which may contain malicious information, the high integrity subject is 
demoted to low integrity, so even when this subject has been infected by some virus in the object, it 
would not be able to further transmit the virus to other high integrity objects or subjects. 
There are two main problems with LOMAC. First, it violates the least privilege principle. It 
prevents low integrity process from harming high integrity process, but it cannot prevent one low 
integrity process from harming another low integrity process. This problem is inherent to Low 
Water Mark model. Second, LOMAC relies on trusted applications to keep better compatibility in 
order to solve the inherent Self-Revocation problem for Low Water Mark model [6]. 
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Since LOMAC is an independent module loaded into system during boot up, it cannot share 
data structure with the kernel. It has to implement its own additional data structures to manage 
security enhancement related attributes. This requirement makes LOMAC larger and more complex 
than equivalent one that interfaces with the kernel through direct modifications of the kernel source 
code. And its correctness is therefore more difficult to verify with formal methods, and resulting in 
a lower quality of protection. Since the compatibility has higher priority in the design of LOMAC 
than that of the quality of protection, such compromise of the security in this implementation is 
reasonable and acceptable [6]. 
2.4 Tripwire 
Tripwire [24] is a data integrity based intrusion detection system. It monitors how UNIX 
and Windows NT file systems and NT registry keys have changed to help system administrator to 
determine whether the integrity of the data has been compromised. 
Tripwire creates a baseline database of files, directories and NT system registry at the very 
beginning with digital signature or digest of the data. After that, it can be scheduled to monitor the 
changes by comparing the current state of the monitored object with the information in the baseline 
database. Any change is reported to Tripwire Manager, to log file and to system administrator via 
email optionally. If a change is actually authorized, a user may update the database so that it will not 
appear as a violation. 
Tripwire has a highly configurable policy language. Files and directories to be monitored 
are defined in the policy file using the policy language. The attributes of the objects can also be 
specified in the policy, such as access permissions and ownerships. Objects can be grouped together 
so that the monitoring rules can be defined over groups instead of individual objects. In this way, 
the rules may have a clearer meaning. 
In Tripwire 3.0, there is a policy wizard, which has a graphical user interface (GUI) that 
lists all the files and folders in a computer system as a tree like the directory tree in Microsoft 
Windows explorer. With this wizard the user may intuitively select objects and properties to 
monitor and then generate the policy file instead of writing the file line by line. This tool makes it 
faster and easier to customize the configuration according to the different requirements for different 
machines. The monitoring rules may also be associated with a system command, which is executed 
whenever the rule, involving the integrity or attributes of the object, is violated. 
Tripwire Manager is a management console that can be used to control Tripwire installed at 
different locations. Tripwire may send reports to Tripwire Manager, so that all the information on an 
enterprise network may be monitored on a single workstation. Tripwire communicates with 
Tripwire Manager via Secure Socket Layer protocol to ensure confidentiality and authenticity. 
Compared with SELinux, LOMAC and TrustedBSD, Tripwire does not provide on-time 
protection. It detects integrity damage at the earliest time that an integrity check is scheduled. 
However, it cannot prevent the damage from happening. The knowledge supplied by Tripwire may 
be used to determine the necessary steps to be taken to recover the system to a state as recorded in 
the baseline database. But it does not provide sufficient information to make the recovery, since it is 
practically impossible to recover data from a piece of digest. In addition, Tripwire itself is still 
vulnerable to integrity damage, which may invalidate the baseline database, because it is also user 
level application. 
11 
3 INTEGRITY PROTECTION MODEL 
3. 1 Definition of Integrity 
In Webster's dictionary, security is defined as the quality or state of being secure as freedom 
from danger, fear or anxiety. 
Also in Webster's dictionary, integrity has the following implications: 
1. firm adherence to a code of especially moral or artistic values: incorruptibility 
2. an unimpaired condition: soundness 
3. the quality or state of being complete or undivided: completeness 
Biba [4] pointed out that "We consider a subsystem to possess the property of integrity if it 
can be trusted to adhere to a well-defined code of behavior. No a priori statement as to the 
properties of this behavior is relevant." Thus no guarantee is implied in the definition of integrity. 
When we need integrity protection, the first thing to do is to define the code of behavior or to 
simply figure out the integrity policy. Generally, integrity in computer system is concerned with the 
guarantee that modifications to data or program in computer system are all authorized. 
3.2 Integrity Threats 
There are different kinds of integrity threats. According to Biba [4], integrity threats may be 
categorized by its source and its type. 
In terms of the source of the threat, we may have external threat and internal threat [ 4]. An 
example of external threat can be an ill-implemented printer driver that may unexpectedly write 
some arbitrary data into the password file. In this case, the damage is in the file system, while the 
modification is from printer driver, which is external to the file system. An example of internal 
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threat may be a bug in the implementation of the file system such that when a normal write is 
carried out, some arbitrary data is unexpectedly written into the password file at the same time. 
Since both the damage and the source of the threat are within the file system, it is internal. 
When the type of integrity threats is being considered, we also have two categories: direct 
and indirect [ 4]. A direct threat is a direct modification to a protected object, such as an attempt to 
modify kernel made by an unprivileged user. An indirect threat is such that the modification to a 
protected object is carried out by third party. Trojan horse program may be an example of indirect 
threat. Although the deployment of a Trojan horse into the file system may be considered to be a 
direct damage to the file system, it does not hurt other part of the file system. When the Trojan horse 
is accidentally executed by a privileged user in the computer, it may cause damage to protected part 
of the system, which can not be done without the appropriate privilege. In this case, the damage is 
caused indirectly by the one who wants to cause the damage. 
3.3 Types of Integrity Policy 
Discretionary Access Control and Mandatory Access Control have long been two major 
types of access control policy. Integrity protection policies may also be divided into two categories 
in the similar way. 
A mandatory integrity policy is one that must be satisfied in all system states once defined 
for an object. This means, as long as the target object still exists in the system, the externally 
defined policy should be satisfied. Human factor is unavoidable in computer systems, because there 
must be some people who have full control of the system. However, it does not mean that the policy 
can be changed within the system, not even by those who have full control. The mandatory nature 
can not be enforced by computer hardware and software only. Part of the enforcement depends on 
the legal system. For example, if the system administrator abuses his privilege of the system and 
modifies the system without authorization according to the policy, there may be nothing to prevent 
such sabotage. However, this system administrator is subject to penalty by the law. 
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A discretionary integrity policy is such that the policy can be changed dynamically at the 
owner's discretion. These two different types of policies may co-exist in a computer system. They 
do not conflict with each other. On the contrary, they complement each other. A request for access 
is only granted when both access control systems grant it. 
3.4 Policy Model 
As we discussed above, integrity itself does not imply any definition of proper behavior of 
the system. So we need to have an integrity policy as the criteria before we can make any judgment 
about the integrity of a system. Normally, we use a mathematical model to represent a policy 
formally. 
A policy is a set of relations defined on a set of elements in the system with some 
operations. More precisely, the relations are defined on the integrity properties of elements in the 
system. These elements can be divided into two categories also, which are subjects and objects. 
Subjects are the system elements that carry out various operations, and the objects are the targets of 
the operations. Normally, we can think of processes as subjects and files, network socket, memory 
as objects, although generally the classification depends on the particular policy. The operations on 
subjects and objects are either read, write or execute. 
In confidentiality protection, security levels and compartments are the security properties to 
isolate system elements into different groups. Similarly, we can have integrity levels and 
compartments to isolate system elements into groups. In each group, the elements have the same 
protection. For simplicity, we only consider integrity levels here and ignore the compartments. 
A policy model M may be defined as tuple (S, 0, I, Level(), r, w, e, C) [4] and the elements 
of the tuple are defined as follows: 
S: the set of subjects. 
0: the set of objects. 
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I: the set of integrity levels that has partial ordering property. When we do not consider 
compartment, the set has full ordering property. 
Level(): S u 0 I, which defines the integrity level of each subject and each object. 
C: a set of constraints concerned with the Level() function and the actions performed by a 
subject on an object and the capability that a subject has on an object. 
r: a binary relation between Sand 0, which defines read access between them. 
w: a binary relation between Sand 0, which defines write access between them. 
e: a binary relation between S and S, which defines execute access between them (Inter-
Process Communication or IPC). 
(r, w and e may mean the corresponding capability or a corresponding action depending on 
the context.) 
3.5 Low Water Mark Model 
Low Water Mark integrity model was defined usmg the above framework [ 4]. In the 
following discussion, when state change is involved in the model, we use the convention, in which 
Level() is the function in original state and Level'() is the one in the state after an operation. With 
this notation, the following three constraints are used to complete the definition of the model: 
Cl: s r o Level'(s) = min{Level(s) , Level(o)} for all subjects and objects. 
C2: s w o Level(o) :S Level(s) for all subjects and objects. 
C3: sl e s2 Level(s2) :S Level(sl) for all subjects. 
Among the three constraints of Low Water Mark model, only Cl is concerned with the 
change of integrity level. Write access and execute access do not change the integrity level. 
By construction, the integrity levels of the objects are fixed. The subjects have dynamic 
non-increasing integrity levels . With this setup, read access is never denied, instead the integrity 
level of the involved subject is demoted. Compared to models that deny read access, this model is 
more application friendly. 
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Combining C 1 and C2, we can see that no subject may write to objects with higher integrity 
after it reads from lower integrity objects. Therefore, the integrity of the objects is preserved when 
various accesses are performed, which means that the indirect integrity threats are addressed by this 
property of system behavior. 
By further examining the constraints, we see that the worst-case scenario under Low Water 
Mark model is that the subjects in the system all have the lowest possible integrity level. In this 
case, the functionality of the system is highly restrictive. This consequence is exactly the trade off 
between convenience and security. In order to preserve the functionality, we will consider some of 
the subjects as trusted or we believe that they will not cause damage no matter what they read. Thus 
the integrity level of these subjects will never be demoted. In practice, trusted subjects need to be 
formally verified to behave properly. However, formal verification of program is beyond the focus 
of this paper, and we simply assume the trustworthiness of the subjects, whose functionalities are 
essential to the entire system. 
3.6 Variations of Low Water Mark Model 
There are two variations of the Low Water Mark model: the Low Water Mark for objects 
and the Low Water Mark integrity audit policy [4]. 
In Low Water Mark for objects, instead of denying the access to high integrity object by 
low integrity subject, this kind of access is allowed and the integrity level of the corresponding 
object is demoted. So in this model, any potential damage to the object is indicated by the change of 
the integrity level. The trustworthiness of an object is directly reflected by its integrity level. 
In Low Water Mark Integrity audit policy, a level of corruption is defined, which provides a 
measure of possible corruption of data with lower integrity level information [ 4]. This measure is 
defined as the current corruption level (cl). 
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If a subject reads information from an object o, the current corruption level of the subject 
after the read access is defined as: 
cl'(s) = min { cl(s), cl( o)}. 
If a subject writes information to an object o, the current corruption level of the object after 
the write access is defined as: 
cl'( o) = min { cl(s), cl( o)} 
For a subject, the current corruption level represents the lowest integrity level of the 
information that the subject may use to modify an object. For an object, its current corruption level 
is the lowest integrity level of the information that may have been used to composite the content of 
the object. 
In both of the above two variations of Low Water Mark model, there is no constraint on 
access decision. So they can not offer any protection to the system. 
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4 SYSTEM DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION 
4. 1 Overview 
Two issues are essential to provide MAC mechanism in operating systems. One is to 
monitor relevant system activities, which is called reference monitor [26]; the other is to enforce 
access decisions on these activities, which is called access mediation. 
In WinLomac, these two tasks are done with interposition. Relevant system services 
requests are intercepted and forwarded to customized code for monitoring and access mediation 
before they are executed. 
In this section, the relevant background, tools, and techniques needed to fulfill these 
requirements are discussed and then the system architecture of WinLomac is revealed. 
4.2 Windows 2000 Kernel Development Environment 
In order to develop WinLomac, Windows 2000 kernel development tools are used. 
Microsoft Software Development Kits (SDKs) is a software package that provides a series of header 
files, libraries, sample code and documentations that are necessary for Windows software 
development. 
Microsoft also provides Windows Driver Development Kits (DDKs) as its official device 
driver development tool kit. This tool kit supplies the necessary header files, library files, sample 
code, and relevant documentation specifically for driver development. Because the inevitable 
interaction between Windows kernel components and device drivers, a lot of kernel data structures 
and function prototypes are defined in DDKs, which are very important for the development of 
WinLomac and other kernel development. A debugging tool i386kd kernel debugger comes with the 
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DDKs. This debugger can be used to analyze the kernel dump obtained during a system crash to 
find out the cause of the crash before a fix can be made. 
Another essential part for kernel development is the debug symbols. In retail version of 
Windows (the version distributed to consumers), debugging information is not compiled in the 
kernel. The debug symbols makes the debugging process much easier by allowing important kernel 
data structures and functions to be accessed by their names (symbols). Moreover, a lot of kernel 
information that is not documented in SDKs and DDKs are revealed by simple observation and 
deduction on the symbol names. 
Microsoft Visual Studio, in particular, Visual C++ (VC) 6.0 Professional is used as the 
programming environment for WinLomac. VC environment is configured to use header files and 
libraries from DDKs and SDKs in compiling WinLomac. The debugging tools (WinDbg, etc.) 
integrated in VC are not used in the development, since these tools are designed for user space 
applications and are not useful for kernel debugging. But they are helpful in analysis of user space 
code that interacts with kernel space. 
Besides tools from Microsoft, we also used the Device Driver Wizard provided in the 
companion CD for book "Undocumented Windows 2000 Secrets". By running this wizard with a 
configuration file, we can obtain a customized device driver skeleton, which does nothing but 
setting up essential device driver routines and data structures. The Demo version of Interactive 
Disassembler (IDA) by Datarescure is used extensively in analyzing WinLomac during debugging. 
4.3 Windows 2000 Kernel Mode Driver 
In Windows 2000 operating system, there is no loadable kernel module concept like in 
Linux. But this does not mean that we have no means of adding code into Windows 2000 kernel 
space. On the contrary, Windows 2000 architecture provides a standard interface to load device 
drivers into kernel space. Although the name indicates that it is supposed to handle some hardware, 
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it can be used to load code in to kernel space. So we take advantage of this interface to load 
WinLomac into the Windows 2000 kernel space. 
The basic components/routines of a Kernel Mode Driver are DriverEntry, AddDevice, 
Dispatch Routines, and Unload. 
"DriverEntry" is a required routine of each device driver. When the driver is loaded, the I/0 
manager calls this routine to initialize driver internal data structures and resources. If this routine 
fails, the driver is not loaded. 
"AddDevice" is used to initialize devices and creates device objects. This routine is required 
by Plug And Play driver. Since WinLomac is a software driver and does not have this feature, this 
routine is not needed and not provided. 
The dispatch routines are used to receive and process IRPs (Input/Output Request Packets). 
There is no requirement of the naming of these routines. "DriverEntry" is responsible to fill the 
entry points of these routines in the dispatch table within the driver object structure. 
"Unload" routine is used to release system resources acquired by the driver, when the driver 
is being unloaded. "DriverEntry" is also responsible to supply the entry point to this routine in the 
driver object structure. Any driver that needs the capability to be unloaded when the system is 
running should have this routine. 
The drivers that are essential to the system should not have "Unload" routine to avoid 
system malfunctioning. Even though the final version of the WinLomac is not unloadable when the 
system is running, this functionality greatly shortened the development and debugging cycle. 
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4.4 Windows 2000 System Services 
Windows 2000 has a Native APL This API is the actual kernel API of Windows 2000. All 
system services are provided by this API, although normally they are not used directly. The well-
known Win32 API is provided in order to make it easier to write applications, which can be viewed 
as a wrapper of the Native API in user space. Win32 API is implemented on top of the Native APL 
All services in Native API are named as Zwxxx [l]. 
The following example is the unassembled code of the user space entry code for 














The service ID for ZwCreateFile is 0x20. This piece of code can be found in user space 
exported by ntdll.dll under symbol name "ntdll!ZwCreateFile". In this code, CPU register EAX is 
loaded with the service ID 0x20. Register EDX is loaded with the address in stack where the 
arguments are stored. Then, the 0x2E interrupt is invoked, which is the gateway between the user 
space and the protected kernel space. 
The handler of INT 0x2E is called KiSystemService, which is not exported. However, it can 
be found in the debug symbols in DDKs. With the service ID, it decides where to dispatch the 
service request so that it can be processed and responded. It uses the value of EAX as the index to 
look up a system table called System Service Dispatch Table (under symbol name KiServiceTable) 
to find the entry point for the requested service and calls it. 
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The pointer to the System Service Dispatch Table is saved in a System Service Table called 
ntoskml, which is the first sub-table of the System Service Descriptor Table. The System Service 
Descriptor Table has the following structure [l]: 
typedef struct SERVICE_DESCRIPTOR_TABLE 
{ 






The data structure of System Service Table is defined as follows [ 1]: 
typedef struct SYSTEM_SERVICE_TABLE 
{ 






PNTPROC is a pointer type, which refers to a pointer to the entry point to a system service. 
In Windows 2000 kernel , the pointer to the System Service Descriptor Table is represented 
by symbol KeServiceDescriptorTable, which is exported by NTOSKRNL.EXE and can be found in 
the context of a kernel thread. 
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80 ,16d28 0 80 47391 8 00000000 000000 £8 80473ofo 
80 4 6d29 0 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 
80 4 6d2a0 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 
8046d2b0 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 
8046d2c0 80473918 00000000 000000 £8 80473c f c 
8046d 2d0 a018d 268 00000000 0000027£ a018dee8 
80 4 6d2e 0 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 
8046d2f0 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 
Figure 2: Example data of KeServiceDescriptorTable 
Figure 2 is the screen capture of a memory dump of the System Service Descriptor Table. In 
this table, we can see that only the first line is used, which is the ntoskrnl sub-table. 
The ServiceTable entry in ntoskrnl table is the pointer to the System Service Dispatch Table 
(under symbol name KiServiceTable), which contains the entry points of the system services 
ordered by their service IDs. The CounterTable is a pointer to an array of invocation counters. The 
ServiceLimit is the number of entries in the ServiceTable. Figure 3 is the screen capture of a 
memory dump of KiServiceTable. 
80473918 804b£ 973 804c03dc 804aabd8 8050el30 
80473928 804c0ef5 8045c3aa 8050f3d9 8050 £419 
8 0 4 7 3 9 3 8 8 0 4 babO c 8 0 5 0 b9 ab 8 0 4 c 3 8 8 3 80 1  fe f cO 
80473948 B04a8f38 804b8035 8044bl 34 804a9a03 
80473958 804a137d 804f2c25 804 ££373 804018da 
80473968 80 4d30 5c 8041900c 804f8f83 8049c5d1 
80473978 bc08a3e0 804a95d1 804bfel e 804c00fd 
80473988 804685b0 804f709d 8049e060 804cc82f 
Figure 3: Example data of KiServiceTable in double words 
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80 473cfc 18 20 2c 2c 40 2c 40 44 - 0c 18 18 08 04 04 Oc 10 
80 473d0c 18 08 08 Oc 08 08 04 04 - 04 Oc 04 20 08 Oc 14 Oc 
80 ~173dl c 2c 1 0 Oc l e 20 1 0 38 10 - 1 4 20 24 le 14 1 0 20 1 0 
80473d2c 34 14 08 04 04 04 Oc 08 - 28 04 le 18 18 18 08 18 
80473d3c Oc 08 Oc 04 10 00 Oc 10 - 28 08 08 1 0 00 le 04 08 
80473d4c 0c 04 1 0 00 08 04 08 0c - 28 10 04 Oc Oc 28 24 28 
80473d5c 30 Oc Oc Oc 18 Oc Oc 0c - 0c 30 10 Oc Oc Oc Oc 10 
80 473d6c 10 Oc Oc 1 4 Oc 1 4 18 1 t1- 08 14 08 08 04 2c le 2/J 
Figure 4: Example data of KiArgumentTable in bytes 
The ArgumentTable is the pointer to an array that stores the number of bytes of the 
arguments for each service. This array is named KiArgumentTable according to the symbol found in 
DDKs. With the number of bytes of arguments on the stack and the pointer in EDX, the kernel will 
be able to copy the arguments from the caller's stack to kernel stack. Figure 4 is the screen capture 
of a memory dump of KiArgumentTable. Figure 5 illustrates the overall structure of these system 
tables. 
KeServiceDescriptorTable 
Address of Ki Service Table 
ntoskml --------=-o-xF=-s,,...· -----
Address of KiArgumentTable -
Unused Entries 
KiServiceTabl.e 
Entry· .. Po~int.s _____ _.__ ____ ----I 
KiArqumentT able 
-. Number of Arguments 
Figure 5: Overall Structure of System Service Data Structure 
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4.5 Intercepting the System Services 
Intercepting the system services 1s done by replacing the corresponding items in the 
KiServiceTable. In order to do this, we first locate the System Service Descriptor Table using 
KeServiceDescriptorTable symbol. The ntoskml System Service Table is the first sub-table of this 
table, as we discussed above. Therefore, the address of the System Service Descriptor Table is the 
same as the address of ntoskml System Service Table. Then we can find the address of the Service 
Dispatch Table easily within ntoskml table. 
After we locate the Service Dispatch Table, the indices of the system services are used to 
look up the table for the entry points of the system services we need to intercept. For each relevant 
system service, the entry po_int to it will be saved in a corresponding variable. And the table entry 
will be replaced with the entry point to the customized intercepting function or the wrapper of the 
system service. When this is being done, the InterlockedExchange function is used to ensure that 
this step is done in an atomic operation. The atomicity here is very important, since it should be 
guaranteed that the system state would be consistent, even if there were other processes in the 
system that also wanted to intercept the same system services at the same time. 
Currently, there is no way to hook system service in a secure and orderly manner. For 
example, module A hooks to a system service and module B changes the same KiServiceTable 
entry to another value after A did it, and saves the original entry address in B's own memory space. 
The address saved by module B is actually an address in module A's memory space. Some time 
later, module A is unloaded and it unhooks this system service. At this point, the system is still 
consistent, if module B does not use this system service. But if module B is to be unloaded from 
kernel , it will try to restore the value of the KiServiceTable entry to the one that it saved. Thus, the 
pointer pointing into module A's memory space will be restored to KiServiceTable. Subsequent 
calls to that system service will be redirected to that address, which may contain unpredictable 
content now. This problem is caused by the design of the operating system itself, in which the 
extension to system services was not taken into consideration. This problem may only be solved by 
redesigning the system kernel. 
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In Figure 3, there is an address 0xBC08E3E0 (bold font) in the KiServiceTable. This table 
entry is the pointer to the ZwClose system service, as the service ID is 0x18 [1]. Since the kernel 
dump file used to get this screen capture was a crash dump cause by WinLomac during 
development, this pointer actually pointed to an address in WinLomac's address space. By 
examining the difference between the prefix of the addresses, you may tell original ones from the 
one hooked by WinLomac, since all of the other pointers point to addresses having 0x8 as a prefix 
and ZwClose's address begins with 0xB. 
4.6 Overall System Architecture 
Applications (11S Server, FTP server, etc.) 
User Mode - ·• - -. - · . - . - - . - . - . - ......... ... _ ..... ..,, -
Access Control 
logic 
.. J ., ....... 
Win l omac 
__.. 
... , . 
Reference 
Monitor 
I I I I I I I I 
I 1777"'1 1 
System 
ServlC(fS 
............ U .... LL.LLL .... 
Figure 6: System Architecture 
Figure 6 illustrates the overall architecture of WinLomac and the way that WinLomac fits 
into Windows 2000 kernel. Reference Monitor is a set of software wrappers of system services. 
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These wrappers are hooked onto the relevant system services so that when a system service is 
invoked, the control flow will be redirected to the wrapper before the original service is called. 
The first thing WinLomac does after it is loaded into kernel is to install the system services 
wrappers so that it can monitor relevant system activities. However, in the prototype, WinLomac is 
initialized to a waiting mode, when it is loaded. In this mode, it is not hooked to the system services 
yet. It waits until it receives a device IO control code for hooking from the user side control 
software. At this time, it processes this request and hooks the system services. 
4. 7 Reference Monitor 
Reference Monitor is divided into two parts in this prototype. The first part is monitoring of 
file accesses. This part is done by intercepting system services. In Figure 7, the logic of a system 
service wrapper is illustrated. 
When a system service request 1s received, the INT 0x2E interrupt handler 
KiSystemService will dispatch the request to corresponding system service. If the requested service 
is intercepted by WinLomac, it will first be forwarded to the wrapper. The wrapper will first retrieve 
the ProcessID and the name of the object that the process requests to access. Then it will consult the 
security policy to determine whether the requested access should be granted or denied according to 
the policy. If the access should be denied, it will do some information logging and then return to 
user space with the error message - Access Denied. If the access is to be granted, it will forward the 
request to the original system service. When the original system service has completed processing 
the request and returned to the wrapper, the wrapper will log certain information and return the 
result from the original system service. 
Access Denied 
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Figure 7: Flow Chart of a System Service Wrapper 
The second part of reference monitor is concerned with process management including 
process creation/termination and binary image (e.g. executable file) loading. This part is done with 
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the call back extension supplied by Windows 2000 kernel. Two process-management calls are used 
to register call back functions. One is PsSetCreateProcessNotifyRoutine; the other is 
PsSetLoadlmageNotifyRoutine. With the first one, a callback routine may be registered so that 
when a process is created, the system will call the registered callback routine to notify the process 
ID. Using the second one, a callback routine may be registered so that whenever a binary image is 
loaded into virtual memory of a process for execution, the routine will be called. 
If we use system service intercepting to monitor process creation, we will need to relate a 
sequence of system service requests, in order to figure out the correspondence between process and 
executable file. This task is very difficult and resource consuming, because the relevant requests are 
most probably interlaced by other system operations. Therefore, by taking advantage of these two 
system features, it is much easier to monitor the process management. 
4.8 Access Control Logic 
The Access Control Logic is the program representation of the security policy or security 
model. It is essentially a function call, which takes subject identity (Process ID), object name, and 
access type as parameters and returns the access decision according to the security policy. It mimics 
the security server in SELinux. In the wrappers of the file access system services, this function is 
called before the original system service is called. If a call to this function returns access denied 
decision, the original system service is not called and an access denied code is returned to the 
requester of the system service directly. The access control logic is also responsible for demoting 
process level whenever necessary according to the security policy. 
The details of the Access Control Logic are clearly illustrated in Figure 8. The levels of the 
requested object and the requesting process are retrieved before an access decision is drawn. Any 
process with an unspecified level will be considered to be trusted so that the functionality of the 
system will not be compromised unnecessarily or unexpectedly. And the requested access is always 
granted to it. This special case may happen because there may be some kernel processes that are 
created before WinLomac is loaded into the kernel. The functionality of these processes is 
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fundamental to the system, so full compatibility should be preserved to guarantee that the overall 
behavior of the system is not compromised. However, for the file integrity labels, no such special 
case is to be allowed, since the concept of a trusted file does not make any difference from high 
integrity level file. In the default assignment, the root directory is assigned high integrity, therefore, 
all sub directories of the root as well as the files in them are considered to have high integrity level, 
except those that are explicitly assigned to low level and their corresponding children in the 
directory hierarchy. 
When the levels of object and subject are obtained, the requested access type is checked. 
When read access is requested, it is always granted, since such access would not damage the 
requested object. However, if the process is of higher level and the level of the object is lower, the 
process is demoted to prevent it from spreading damage into area of the system of higher integrity 
level. When write access is requested, the access is granted if the level of the process is higher or 
equal to the level of the object. 
Since a read access to a lower level object may cause integrity damage to a process, and the 
compromised process may spread the damage by writing to other objects in the same integrity level, 
the process should have an integrity level, which is not higher than the level of any object, from 
which it has ever read information. This is guaranteed by demoting process level when it is higher 
than the level of the object that it requests to read. 
When read access is requested, one special possibility is that some file is being loaded for 
execution. In this case, the system creates a process first and loads the file into the memory space 
for the process. When the process is created, the call back function registered with 
PsSetCreateProcessNotifyRoutine will be called with creation flag set to true and the process ID is 
save into our process list. When the process is terminated, the call back function will remove the 
process ID from the list. And when binary image is to be loaded into memory for the created 
process, the call back function registered with PsSetLoadlmageNotifyRoutine will be called with 
the designated process ID as well as the path and file name of the executable file. The call back 
function will assign the integrity level of the process to the same level as the file. These subtleties 
are not illustrated in Figure 8. 
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Figure 8: Access Control Logic 
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For simplicity, the execute access in Low Water Mark integrity model is not monitored in 
WinLomac, since IPC is very complicated. In particular, when shared memory is concerned, 
information leaking or damage spreading in memory may not be monitored in practice [27]. 
4.9 Kernel Protection 
The kernel itself is of high integrity, but the protection offered by Low Water Mark model 
can not directly prevent the direct tampering of the kernel. The reason is that the semantics of access 
to the kernel is not very clear, since kernel itself is not a process or a subject. But neither can we 
consider the kernel as an object, because it does have some active behavior. 
In Windows 2000, the loading of a device driver is done by calling ZwLoadDriver system 
service. The information of the device driver is supplied in the argument. The caller of this system 
service does not have to read the device driver file to load it, so even high integrity process may 
load a low integrity device driver into kernel memory and compromise the integrity of the kernel. 
Also, when ZwLoadDriver system service is dispatched by the kernel, we cannot demote the 
integrity level of kernel, since the kernel is not a subject and the semantics of demoting the kernel is 
not clear. 
Because of these considerations, the kernel protection is treated as a special case. And the 
protection of the kernel from malicious manipulation is done by intercepting ZwLoadDriver and 
ZwUnloadDriver system services to prevent any process from loading low integrity device drivers. 
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S_TESTING AND EVALUATION 
We have outlined the design and implementation and other relevant issues of WinLomac in 
previous sections. In this section, we discuss the experimental results concerned with the 
effectiveness of WinLomac and evaluate the performance. 
5. 1 Test Bed Setup 
The testing of the effectiveness of WinLomac is conducted under Windows 2000 Server+ 
Internet Information Services (IIS) 5 .0 + Indexing Service. A clean installation of the original 
release of Windows 2000 Server is used so that the .ida/.idq buffer overflow exploit is not patched. 
Two buffer overflow attacks are conducted against the testing server. One is done without 
WinLomac installed; the other is done with WinLomac installed. The results are compared to show 
the effectiveness of WinLomac. 
A series of timed file copying, file comparison and file download operations are carried out 
on our experimental server without and with WinLomac to evaluate the performance overhead. 
5.2 Labeling Consideration 
For Low Water Mark integrity model, we need to figure out how to divide the system into 
two categories. Windows environment is very different from the Unix operating systems. In Unix, 
directories are arranged in a categorized manner, which is actually respected by many users. For 
example, /boot is the directory for bootup purpose; /etc is the directory for configuration files, etc. 
In Windows, although directories are also supposed to be arranged in a similar fashion, the actual 
directory structure in one installation may vary greatly from another. 
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Suppose that we have the default installation of Windows 2000, "C:\WINNT" should be the 
directory where the system root is located. Therefore, this folder and folders underneath it should 
have higher integrity protection. In "C:\", there are some files essential to system startup due to the 
old Microsoft DOS operating system convention, such as autoexec.bat and config.sys, which also 
need higher integrity protection. In particular, autoexec.bat is used to load various components 
during system start up, which may be taken advantage of to load unwanted modules. "C:\Documents 
and Settings\Administrator" should have higher protection, which is the personal profile for system 
Administrator. "C:\Documents and Settings\All Users" is the folder where information common to 
every user is stored, thus it should have higher integrity protection. 
Every user in Windows 2000 has a profile in "C:\Documents and Settings\" using the 
account name as the subdirectory name, such as "C:\Documents and Settings\john". If one user is in 
privileged user group, the corresponding subdirectory should have higher protection. 
"C:\Program Files" is the directory where all program files are installed. Thus, it should also 
have higher protection. When many programs are installed, the assignment of integrity level will be 
a complicated issue, since we will need to trade off compatibility and protection. Since we are 
concerned with a server environment, we assume that the only mission critical programs are 
installed and thus all of them need higher integrity protection. 
Directory "C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Local Settings\Temporary Internet 
Files" is used for storing all the temporary files downloaded from internet for display in Internet 
Explorer. This directory should be assigned low integrity so that Internet Explorer (IE) may function 
properly. 
The IIS web root directory "C:\lnetPub" is assigned high integrity, because it contains all 
web files, which if damaged, may have unpredictable effect on people who visit the website. If the 
web server needs to write to some file in order to interact with web clients, the files where date are 
stored should be assigned as low integrity or be put in a sub-directory that is assigned low integrity 
level, because we can not assume that data provided by clients are not malicious. 
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5.3 An Example Exploit 
A buffer overflow attack is used to test the effectiveness of WinLomac. We introduce the 
general idea of buffer overflow attack first and then describe the specific exploit we will use in the 
test. 
5.3.1 Buffer Overflow Attack 
Buffer overflow attack is a kind of intrusion that takes advantage of the architecture of Intel 
CPU, which allows execution of code in stack memory. 
The code in Figure 9 illustrates the common process to setup a stack at the beginning of the 
execution of a procedure. When a procedure is called, it first saves on top of the stack the EBP 
register, which is a pointer on stack memory segment. It then saves the stack pointer ESP in EBP. 
The total size of local storage is subtracted from ESP so that the future operations on stack will not 
damage the local variables. EBP is later used as the base address for local variables and arguments. 
As in the last instruction in Figure 9, the local variables are accessed by using addresses relative to 
EBP. If the relative address is positive, the memory accessed is an argument for the procedure. If 
the relative address is negative, it is a local variable. The structure of the stack right after the 
execution of SUB ESP, SIZE instruction in Figure 9 is illustrated in Figure 10. 
PUSH EBP 
MOU EBP, ESP 




MOU [EBP+UARIABLE_OFFSET], 8 
Figure 9: The Code Used to Setup the Stack 
Since the local variables are stored in stack segment, improper memory access may change 
the data on stack of the caller or any data in the stack segment. Suppose we have a pointer to a local 
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variable. If some positive-number is added to this pointer, it is possible to obtain a new pointer that 




SIZE Local Variables 




Figure 10: Windows Stack Layout 
An unchecked buffer is such that when the data are filled in the buffer, the length of the data 
is not checked. So if the length of the data is longer than the buffer size, the buffer index pointer 
will be incremented beyond the boundary of the buffer and possibly reach EBP and further. Such a 
buffer may be taken advantage of and change the return address of the caller located at EBP+Ox4. 
Therefore, when the procedure returns, it will not return to the next instruction in the caller 
immediately after the instruction, which issued the call to current procedure. Instead, it will return to 
the new return address that has been overflowed. 
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In the same way, executable code may be written into the stack. If we want to execute such 
code, everything needed now is to overflow the return address with a new one that points to a JMP 
or CALL instruction that takes the execution flow onto the stack. Among such instructions, the best 
choices are JMP ESP and CALL ESP, because these two instructions will divert the execution to 
precisely where the ESP points to. Since EBP is another pointer for stack memory, it may also be 
used. In addition, EBX may be an alternative, because when EBX is used in combination with 
CALL or JMP instruction, the destination address is relative to ESP. 
When JMP EBX or CALL EBX is used, the value of EBX is unknown, which means that 
the exact address that the execution is diverted to is unpredictable and it is possible JMP/CALL 
instruction misses the attacking code. However, normally, the value of EBX is bounded, because the 
size of local variables is bounded. Thus, we can overflow some instructions that do not change the 
execution flow in front of the code that we want to execute on stack. Therefore, even though, the 
JMP or CALL may not hit exactly the place we want, after the execution of a bunch of NOP 
instructions, the execution will finally reach the code we place on the stack. 
5.3.2 .ida/.idq Buffer Overflow 
Microsoft Indexing Service is a service in Windows 2000 that extracts content from files 
and makes an index so that searching may be more efficient. The files being indexed may be located 
on local or remote storage. 
Web content querymg is one of the most important features of the Internet. Indexing 
Service may be used to boost the speed of querying and indexing web content. Therefore, it is 
integrated with IIS so that the indexing and querying of web content may be conducted with 
Indexing Service. Besides querying, the Indexing Service also allows web-based administration of 
the index on the web server. The queries to the Indexing Service are stored in Internet Data Query 
( .idq) files and if administrative features are demanded, the parameters for the requests are stored in 
Internet Data Administration (.ida) files. 
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The Indexing Service and the IIS server are bridged together by Internet Server Application 
Programming Interface (ISAPI), which filters the web requests and dispatches request to 
corresponding handlers based on the request type. The exploit used in the testing of the 
effectiveness of WinLomac is an unchecked buffer in the .ida/.idq ISAPI filter. In the piece of code 
that handles URL for Indexing Service, there is an unchecked buffer [ 19]. This piece of code runs in 
the system context, therefore the attacker may fake a web request to the Indexing Service and 
overflow the buffer to execute arbitrary code in system context on the web server. 
The buffer overflow occurs in the filtering of the web request before the actual invocation 
of the Indexing Service. Although the request is targeted the Indexing Service, it does not really 
matter whether the service is running or not for an attacker to take advantage of the exploit. It only 
requires the web server to be configured to accept request for Indexing Service for the web server to 
be vulnerable. 
Microsoft Index Server 2.0 on Windows NT and Indexing Service on Windows 2000 are 
affected by this exploit. Indexing Service in versions of Windows XP prior to Release Candidate 1 
is also affected by this vulnerability. The infamous Code Red and Code Red II worms both take 
advantage of this vulnerability and compromised tens of thousands of Windows NT/2000 computers 
around the world. Code Red accounted for $2.6 billion in damage -- $1.5 billion in lost productivity 
and $1.1 billion in clean-up costs [20]. From these figures, we can have a taste about the severity of 
this problem, which well justifies the choice to use this vulnerability to test the effectiveness of 
WinLomac. 
5.4 Effectiveness Evaluation 
We adapt the hsj' s proof of concept attacking program [28] and use it to carry out attacks 
against our target Windows 2000 server in order to analyze WinLomac' s impact on the attacks. 
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5.4.1 Attacking Program 
The .ida/.idq buffer overflow vulnerability was discovered by eeye.com and the report was 
released on June 18, 2001. A concept proof program taking advantage of this vulnerability was 
release on Internet on June 21, 2002 by someone named "hsj". The code for this program is still 
available on the Internet [28]. 
Attacker 
Construct the URL 
with attacking 
code 
















Attacker on port 81 
Receive the File 
Sent by Attacker 
Execute the 
Downloaded File 
Figure 11: Flowchart of hsj's Proof of Concept Program 
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This program requires two command line parameters. One is the victim machine's IP 
address. The other is the filename for an executable file, which is to be sent to the victim server via 
a back connection channel and executed on the victim server. Figure 11 illustrates how hsj' s 
program works. 
This program first constructs a special Unique Resource Locator (URL) combined with 
attacking code and sends it to the vulnerable server (target) to overflow the stack in ISAPI. At this 
point, the attacking program opens a listen TCP socket on port 81 waiting for a connection from the 
target. The target, when overflowed, runs the code embedded in the URL, and tries to connect to the 
attacker and downloads the file prepared by the attacker and saves it to "C:\aa.exe" and runs it. 
5.4.2 Attack Setup 
The proof of concept program is used to launch buffer overflow attacks to IIS server with 
Indexing Service running on Windows 2000 Server. Since in Windows environment, programs are 
dynamically linked in memory, it is also necessary for the attack program to link to relevant library 
calls on the fly. In order to link library functions, it is essential to link two functions supplied by 
kemel32.dll. One is GetModuleHandleA; the other is GetProcAddress. The program provided by hsj 
does not obtain the entry addresses of these two functions dynamically; instead, it uses the fixed 
addresses, which are specific to a particular release of Windows 2000. Therefore, we have to 
modify the addresses to fit it into the release of Windows 2000 used for the testing. The entry 
addresses can be found by using dependency viewer to view the header structure of the kemel32.dll, 
in which these two functions are exported. 
In Figure 12, we can see that the base address for module keme132.dll is 0x77E8000. Also 
we see the relative entry point for GetProcAddress within kemel32.dll is 0x0001564B. So by adding 
the relative entry point to the base address of the module, the actual entry point address of 
GetProcAddress is 0x77E9564B in current process context. Similarly, the entry point address of 
GetModuleHandleA is 0x77E956DB. 
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Figure 12: Export Table of KERNEL32.DLL 
After we have these two addresses, they can be used to query information about every 
module in the system and every function in any of the modules so that we can obtain the entry 
addresses to all other functions that are needed to complete the attack. For example, in this attack, 
we need to establish socket connection from victim machine to attacking machine. So one of the 
modules we need to query about is ws2_32, which is the dynamic linked library of WinSock 
(windows version of socket functions). The relevant functions we need to query in ws2_32 are 
connect, recv, closesocket. 
Besides the dynamic linking of library functions, the overflowed return address also needs 
to be chosen so that when the current call returns, the return pointer points to some instructions, 
which, when executed, will lead the execution flow onto the stack, where the overflowed attacking 
code is located. In this case, instructions using ESP or EBP can not be found in kernel32.dll. 
Fortunately, there is one CALL EBX instruction in kernel32.dll as illustrated in Figure 13, which 
shows a piece of unassembled code in kernel32.dll. The CALL EBX instruction is found at address 
0x77E82EA 7. Thus, if we overflow the procedure return address with 0x77E82EA 7, this CALL 
EBX instruction will be executed when the current procedure returns, which will divert the 
execution flow to the stack. 
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77E82E9F INC EAX 
77E82EA0 PUSH EAX 
77E82EA1 PUSH DWORD PTR [EBP-2lfH] 
77E82EAlf PUSH DWORD PTR [ESI+58H] 
77E82EA7 CALL EBX 
77E82EA9 ADD ESP, 0CH 
77E82EAC MOU EAX, [EBP-28H] 
77E82EAF INC EAX 
77E82EB0 MOU [ESI+86H], AX 
77E82EB7 XOR EAX, EAX 
Figure 13: CALL EBX Instruction in Kernel32.dll 
The executable file to be sent to the server in the attack is ncx99 .exe. When it is executed, it 
always listens on TCP port 99 and directs the incoming connection to this port to a command shell. 
So if the attack is successful, we will be able to establish a remote shell to the victim computer. And 
this is exactly what some of the hackers will do to take full control of the victim systems. 
5.4.3 Result of the Experiments 
Two .ida/.idq buffer overflow attacks are conducted on the target system without 
WinLomac and on the same system with WinLomac installed. 
In our experiments, we use tcpcat [21] to verify whether an attack is successful or not. This 
tool is a network utility that can be run in server mode to listen on a specified local port or in client 
mode to connect to some port on a specified host. We use it in client mode to attempt to establish a 
connection to the backdoor on TCP port 99 of the victim computer, which should be deployed by a 
successful attack. 
The attacking computer is called "numbers". And the target Windows 2000 Server is called 
"mocha". Figure 14 and Figure 15 are the screen captures of these two experiments, which are 
explained below. 
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1. D:\nc>echo %COMPUTERNAME% 
2. NUMBERS 
3. 
q_ D:\nc>tcpcat -h mocha:99 -i -o 
5. connected to mocha (***·***·**.107) on port 99. 
6. Microsoft Windows 2000 [Uersion 5.00.2195] 
7. (C) Copyright 1985-1999 Microsoft Corp. 
8. 
9. C:\WINNT\system32>ECHO %COMPUTERNAME% 





15. 18q bytes transfered in 2q_06 seconds (0.01 K/s) 
16. 
17. D:\nc> 
Figure 14: Obtaining Remote Shell After Successful Attack 
In the experiment without using WinLomac, the attack is successful. Figure 14 is the screen 
capture of the process that we obtain a remote shell to the victim server after the attack. The IP 
address is masked here to protect privacy. On line 1, we display the computer name, which is 
"numbers". And then we use tcpcat to attempt a TCP connection to "mocha" on port 99, which is 
successful. The command line prompt indicates that we get the shell. We then display the computer 
name again, which, this time, is "mocha". This tells us that the command line is actually a remote 
shell of "mocha". 
33796 964 inetinfo, exe ZwCreateFile 1 \Device\Afd\Endpoint 
33798 964 inetinfo, exe security PID 964 -L2 , FILE \Device\Afd\Endpoint -Ll, t_access 2 
35359 964 inetinfo, exe ZwCreateFile 1 \Device\Afd\Endpoint 
35360 964 inetinfo, exe security PID 964 -Ll , FILE \Device\Afd\Endpoint -Ll, t_access 2 
40210 964 inetinfo, exe security PID 964 -Ll , FILE \??\C:\WINNT\System32\idq.dll -L2, t_access 0 
40211 964 inetinfo. exe Proc 84252020 ZwOpenFile non-w .. , \Device\HarddiskVolume 1 \ WINNT\system32\idq. dll Handle 5dc 01 
40219 964 inetinfo, exe ZwCreateFile 1 \??\C:\aa.exe 
40220 964 inetinfo, exe security PID 964 -Ll , FILE \??\C:\aa .exe -L2, t_access 2 
40221 964 inetinfo, exe ZwCreateFile access denied \??\C:\aa.exe 
Figure 15: Selected File Access Record in an Attempted Attack 
Figure 15 is the edited screen capture of our access monitor Graphical User Interface (GUI). 
The irrelevant items in the screen are removed in order to make the list short. At the beginning, 
inetinfo.exe process, which has Process ID 964, has integrity level 2 (33798). It attempts to create a 
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socket end point, so it is demoted. In the records for subsequent access attempts, the integrity level 1 
is indicated (35360). 
When a web request comes in, the requested URL is passed to ISAPI filters and since our 
attack uses a request of .idq type, the URL is forwarded to idq.dll for processing (40210). The 
unchecked buffer in idq.dll is overflowed and the attacking code attempts to download the file sent 
by the attacking machine and to write this file in "C:\aa.exe". Because "C:\" is of integrity level 2, 
the requested write operation is denied (40221). 
Besides these positive results, a specialty is worth mentioning. Some of the executable files 
for the IIS server are located in "C:\WINNT\SYSTEM32\INETSRV" directory, which should have 
high integrity level. In our experiment, it turns out that the IIS server requires write access to this 
directory, which forces us to label this directory as low integrity level and leave the IIS server 
vulnerable to integrity sabotage. It is not a good design strategy for processes ( other than compiler 
process) to demand write access to executable files. This issue should and could only be solved by 
modifying the design of IIS server itself, which can only be done by Microsoft C~)fporate or its 
associates. 
5.5 Performance Evaluation 
When WinLomac is used to protect the integrity of the system, due to the added reference 
monitor, it casts some performance overhead to operations on the objects, in particular, file 
operations. A series of file copying is conducted to quantitatively evaluate the performance 
overhead incurred by applying WinLomac. 
The test bed for the performance evaluation is Pentium II 233MHz CPU + 192MB memory. 
A set of 3059 files in 296 directories of a total 428MB is used in the testing. The whole directory 
structure is copied to another place on the disk. During the copying, file and directory creation, data 
read and write operations are all involved, so that we will have an overall view of WinLomac's 
impact on the performance of the system. 
44 
The data from the testing are collected in Figure 16. Each testing is repeated 10 times. Tl 
represents the testing without the presence of WinLomac. T2 is the counterpart with WinLomac. 
From the data, we can see that all the testing complete within around 5 minutes 50 seconds. In 
Figure 16, we see that two lines are very close to each other. The average completion time for Tl is 
5 minutes 48 seconds and 372 milliseconds, which is 348.372 seconds. T2 takes 5 minutes 53 
seconds and 884 milliseconds or 353.884 seconds on average, which is 5.512 seconds or 1.58% 
slower than Tl. 
06 :28.800 









1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
I-T1 05:50.193 05:56.653 05:50.524 05:48.651 05:45.938 05:47.389 05:43.614 05:49.963 05:48.688 05:42.110 
I----·--· T2 05:55.020 05:48.041 05:51.896 05:46.899 05:58.546 05:54.450 05:52.958 06:01.169 05:51.175 05:58.686 
Figure 16: Performance Comparison 
From the companson, we see that the performance overhead incurred by applying 
WinLomac is very small. Moreover, this 5.512 seconds latency is based on the operations on 
428MB data in 3059 files . In regular operation, the amount of data involved is far less than this, and 
absolute value of the delay will be in the order of 10 milliseconds, which will be negligible in 
practice. 
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6 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORKS 
6. 1 Conclusion 
This paper describes the design and implementation of WinLomac, which is a prototype of 
Low Water Mark integrity model based mandatory access control module for Windows 2000 
operating system. The experimental result regarding its effectiveness shows that it does provide 
integrity protection successfully. In addition, the performance overhead incurred by adding 
WinLomac is minimal. 
Most importantly, WinLomac's capability shows that it is possible to incorporate kernel 
based MAC protection into Windows 2000 operating system by third party developers, though the 
task is not easy. Besides this, the module-based design and implementation indicate that the security 
enhancement to Windows 2000 kernel may be added modularly so that the installation may be done 
without the reinstallation of the whole operating system. 
Our software prototype WinLomac only enforces the integrity protection according to a 
two-leveled Low Water Mark integrity model with subjects being processes and objects being files. 
Only operations based on regular file operations may be mediated. The execution access (IPC) in 
Low Water Mark model is not implemented due to the complexity. Therefore, it can only prevent 
potential security breaches in the operating system that depend on the monitored file operations 
from being exploited. For example, it prevents the damage caused by buffer overflow from 
spreading within the file system in accordance with the Low Water Mark model. In real life, it may 
also prevent the installation of root kits, remote deployment of Trojan horses, etc. 
Judging from the experience of the development of WinLomac, one of the reasons for the 
non-existence of a large third party developer community for Windows 2000 kernel is obvious: the 
unavailability of technical information on Windows 2000 kernel. Although WinLomac is not a big 
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project, its development is very time consuming and difficult. Hundreds of system crashes were 
experienced during the entire process. 
Compared with security enhancement projects for Linux and FreeBSD operating systems, 
SELinux and TrustedBSD offer many more security features than WinLomac, although SELinux 
does not offer mandatory integrity protection. SELinux is also a very stable product. SELinux and 
TrustedBSD also differ from WinLomac in that they are implemented based on modifying kernel 
source code, while WinLomac is an independent module. 
LOMAC project has more in common with WinLomac. Both of them implement Low 
Water Mark integrity model. LO MAC is more complete and mature. It handles network access 
more precisely and it can handle pipe access. Both LOMAC and WinLomac are module-based. 
LOMAC uses the Linux built-in loadable kernel module interface to load itself into the kernel 
space, while WinLomac is loaded into Windows kernel space as a device driver, which is not a 
systematic way to integrate security features into the system. Furthermore, the Linux Security 
Modules (LSM) based LOMAC is under development. LSM based Linux provides an interface so 
that security features can be integrated into the system systematically. Currently, Windows 
operating systems do not provide such interfaces. 
Tripwire is an integrity protection product that supports Windows environment. The 
protection policy of Tripwire is very precise and fine-grained. However, it can only detect integrity 
damage after it has happened. On the contrary, WinLomac detects potential integrity damage and 
stops it before it happens. Additionally, Tripwire is a user space application, which is also subject to 
integrity sabotage and can be rendered useless. WinLomac is loaded into the kernel space, which is 
a protected part of the system. Furthermore, when WinLomac is installed, the kernel space is also 
assigned to high integrity level, thus it is also under integrity protection of WinLomac. Therefore, it 
is much harder to tamper with WinLomac to disable it or circumvent it. 
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6.2 Future Works 
As WinLomac is only a prototype of our design and implementation of Low Water Mark 
integrity protection in Windows 2000, it still has potential for improvements. The following is a list 
of some possible future works. 
6.2.1 Handling Pipes 
At this moment, only network endpoint is considered in WinLomac. Although this is the 
mam method used for inter-computer communication, it is not the only popular inter-process 
communication channel. Pipes are widely used in inter-process communication under Windows 
environment. Integrity damage may also spread via this channel. Therefore, some works need to be 
done to take pipes into consideration. 
According to T. Fraser, pipes are very hard to handle, because of the Self-Revocation 
problem [6], which is inherent for the Low Water Mark integrity model. The suggested solution is 
to group processes into jobs so that the demotion applies to the job instead of individual processes. 
This solves the problem to some extent, but the introduction of this new concept complicates the 
understanding of system. In newer release of LOMAC, they have already given up considering a 
process group as a subject and started to use single process as demotion unit to have finer grained 
control as well as a subject concept that is more consistent with common sense. 
6.2.2 Better Labeling 
The current design and implementation uses Windows Registry to save the labels of the file 
system. The levels of files are based on brute force pair wise comparisons of the labels, which is not 
very efficient. Due to this inefficiency, it will not be proper to have very fine grained labeling for 
files, since the comparison over a large number of file names will cause a very high performance 
overhead. Moreover, in WinLomac, lazy comparison is used, which only takes the first match for 
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the access decision. This kind of decision-making process itself may not be proper for fine grained 
labeling. 
Integrating labeling into the file system such as making the label part of the extended 
attributes of the files may be a reasonable solution, though to change the behavior of the file system 
may be very difficult without enough technical information. 
6.2.3 Finer Grained Control of Network Access 
Although Windows 2000 operating system provides a socket library for users to utilize IP 
based network conveniently, the set of functions are provided via a separate dynamic linked library 
instead of the file system calls. Furthermore, this socket library is provided in user space only. It 
uses device 1/0 control functions to communicate with network protocol drivers in the kernel space, 
which then interpret device 1/0 request and complete the network communication. 
Due to the limited access to technical resources, the network monitoring is very crude at 
this time. Whenever there is an attempt to open a network endpoint, it is regarded as a potential 
cause for integrity damage and the requesting process is demoted to low integrity level if it was of 
high integrity level, even if nothing is read from the network end point finally. Therefore, the 
protection behavior is overly conservative. In addition, because the parameters for opening an 
endpoint are not known yet, WinLomac can not distinguish one network end point from another, 
which means that it can not divide the network to different areas based on the trustworthiness of the 
end point and the granularity of network related access control is very coarse. This problem 
compromises the compatibility cost incurred by WinLomac, since a process should not be demoted 
simply because it reads some information from some place that does not contain any information 
that may cause the process to damage the system. 
An in-depth investigation into the user/kernel mode interface of network subsystem in 
Windows 2000 kernel will be necessary to decipher exactly how user space applications 
communicate with remote computer workstations using the services provided by the kernel. When 
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such technical information is available, finer grained network reference monitor may be designed 
and implemented so that the granularity of mandatory access control may be improved accordingly. 
6.2.4 Integrating with Security Subsystem of Windows 2000 
Currently, WinLomac adds integrity protection to Windows 2000 operating system by 
intercepting the system services and makes access decision before the invocation of the requested 
original services. Windows 2000 has its own security subsystem, which is a set of system level 
functions. Every system service in the kernel uses the interface provided by the security subsystem 
to decide whether specific access request should be denied or granted. Thus, another possible 
method to add protection is to intercept the function calls to the security subsystem instead of 
intercepting the system services. In this way, we need to write a wrapper for the security subsystem. 
When a system service requests the security subsystem to consult about an access decision, the 
request is processed by the wrapper before it is forwarded to the original security subsystem. 
In order to add additional security protection to the security subsystem of Windows 2000 
operating system, intensive research on the security subsystem of Windows 2000 is necessary. One 
of the foreseeable major difficulties in such a development will still be the unavailability of 
technical documentation and kernel source code. 
6.2.5 Port to Windows NT 
Although Microsoft Corporation ended support for Windows NT in year 2000, due to 
various reasons many companies are still using Windows NT. These companies are also under 
security threat and need protection. Thus, it demands some efforts to port WinLomac to Windows 
NT operating system. 
Windows 2000 is developed based on Windows NT. Although there are so many changes 
and augmentations, it inherits many features of Windows NT in architecture, especially in kernel 
level. 
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These two operating systems share the same system service dispatch mechanism. The basic 
components of device drivers are also very similar, except that Windows 2000 provide PnP support. 
WinLomac is a software device driver, which only takes advantage of the device driver support 
system in Windows to load code into kernel space and does not use PnP feature. Although 
WinLomac is designed and implemented for Windows 2000, due to the similarities between 
Windows 2000 and Windows NT, porting it to Windows NT may be possible. 
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